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PnoCEss-lMMuNITY FROM SERVICE-PERSON EN'I'ERING A STATE TO FILB
AcnoN-Petitioner, a resident of Missouri, entered California to gain custody
of his child from its maternal grandmother. After eight days of fruitless negotiation he commenced habeas corpus proceedings. While attempting to serve the
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner was served with a summons in an action brought
AN
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by the grandmother for support of the child. When the trial court denied petitioner's motion to quash the service of summons on him, he sought a writ of
prohibition from the district court of appeals to prevent further prosecution of
the second ~ction. Held, petition denied; petitioner's eight day delay justified
inference that his controlling purpose in entering the state was not to file an
action. Franklin v. Superior Court, (Cal. App. 1950) 220 P. (2d) 8.
As a general rule, nonresidents who enter a state to testify at the trial of an
action are immune from the service of civil process in another action while in
court and for a reasonable time required in coming and going.1 The privilege
extends to persons who are witnesses only2 and generally also to persons who are
both witnesses and parties to the action. 3 These exemptions are founded on
sound public policy in that the due administration of justice requires that persons
whose presence is necessary to the full presentation of a cause should be available to the court and should be encouraged to enter the state without fear of
being served with process in another action.4 But because the principle of immunity is in derogation of every creditor's right to subject. his debtor to suit
wherever the debtor is found, the privilege should not be extended beyond the
reason of the rule on which it is founded. 5 The immunity rule has been extended
to include nonresident parties in attendance on any judicial proceeding which
directly relates to the examination of the issues of fact involved. 6 Thus, the
privilege has been granted to a nonresident party present to attend the taking
of depositions of his adversary's witnesses7 and to a nonresident creditor present to
attend a hearing before a commissioner in bankruptcy.8 Since in these instances
the presence of such persons facilitates the full presentation of the cause, these
decisions are well within the policy behind the rule. On the other hand, it is
generally recognized that one who comes into a jurisdiction merely to confer
with counsel, or to discuss matters that may become the subject of litigation, is
not exempt.9 The usual statement of the immunity rule is broad enough to include within its-terms persons who enter a state to commence an action. 10 Howl Moseley v. Ricks, 223 Iowa .1038, 277 N.W. 23 (1937); Cooper v. Wyman, 122
N.C. 784, 29 S.E. 947 (1898).
2Nichols v. Norton, (8th Cir. 1882) 14 F. 327.
3 Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S.Ct. 44 (1916); Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass.
499, 105 N.E. 363 (1914). Some jurisdictions do not grant the privilege to parties, even
though they are also witnesses. Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 15 A. 579 (1892);
Guynn v. McDaneld, 4 Idaho 606, 43 P. 74 (1895). In Connecticut, defendants are immune but plaintiffs are not. Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858); Wilson Sewing Machine
Co. v. Wilson, 51 Conn. 595 (1884); Ryan v. Ebecke, 102 Conn. 12, 128 A. 14 (1925).
4 Sofge v. Lowe, 131 Tenn. 626, 176 S.W. 106 (1915); Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 3 Boyce (26 Del.) 1, 79 A. 790 (1911); ALDERSON, JonrCIAL WRITS AND PROCESS
§119 (1895).
.
5 Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P. (2d) 741 (1932). See also Guynn v. McDaneld, supra note 3.
6 Durst v. Tautges, (7th Cir. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 507.
7 Parker v. Marco, 137 N.Y. 585, 32 N.E. 989 (1893).
8 Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882).
9 Vaughn v. Boyd, 142 Ga. 230, 82 S.W. 576 (1914); Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards,
supra note 4.
10 Stewart v. Ramsay, supra note 3.
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ever, there appears to be no decided case holding that such a person is immune,
nor any case holding to the contrary. It is submitted that such persons should
not be immune, since the only sound basis for the rule limits the privilege to
persons whose presence is necessary to the court in the administration of justice.11
However, the courts have often used reasons to support the immunity rule that
are as applicable to persons who enter a state to file an action as they are to
parties who enter to attend the trial.12 Moreover, immunity has been granted to
persons whose presence could not be considered necessary to the court. Thus,
parties present to attend argument on demurrer13 and parties present to attend
proceedings before an appellate tribunal14 have been ·held exempt. These decisions and statements of policy have been criticized;15 and it is difficult to see
that any real public interest is served by making exempt from service of process
persons whose presence is not necessary to the determination of the cause.
However, there is some authority for extending the privilege to a person who
enters a state to commence an action. The court in the principal case shows no
unwillingness to grant immunity to such a person, 16 but the decision rests on a
different ground. Petitioner was denied the privilege because his controlling purpose in entering California was not to commence litigation but to gain
custody of his child without litigation. No court has granted immunity to any
party unless it appeared that his "main and controlling reason"17 in entering the
jurisdiction had some reference to judicial proceedings, and some courts require
that attendance on such proceedings be his "sole purpose.'118 It is submitted that
the decision is thus consistent with the general current of the authorities.

Patrick J. Ledwidge

11 Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, supra note 4. Keeffe and Roscia, "Immunity and
Sentimentality," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 471 (1947).
12 Halsey v. Stewart, l Southard (4 N.J.L.) 426 (1817); Stewart v. Ramsay, supra
note 3.
1s Kinne v. Lant, (C.C. Mich. 1895) 68 F. 436.
14 Chase National Bank v. Turner, 269 N.Y. 397, 199 N.E. 636 (1936).
15 Keeffe and Roscia, "Immuuity and Sentimentality," 32 CoRN. L.Q. 471 (1947).
10 Principal case at IO.
17Burroughs v. Cocke, 56 Okla. 627, 156 P. 196 (1916).
18 Connelly v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 227 Mich. 139, 198 N.W. 585 (1924); Sofge
v. Lowe, supra note 4.

